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ABSTRACT: Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services Program–PESP was launched in 1997. It is a market-oriented 
policy instrument designed to stimulate forest conservation by making monetary payments to landowners who 
choose not to engage in deforestation or to engage in forest recovery or plantations on their properties. This 
article focuses on the basic concepts and on the early years of the program’s performance, using data published 
by the program’s management agency as well as data and analysis published in a limited number of the numer-
ous texts that examine this pioneering experience in payments for environmental services. Findings show that 
in its early years (between 1997 and approximately 2003) the program managed to reverse a severe process 
of deforestation and even expand the total area of forested lands in Costa Rica. It corrected market failures 
and created trade opportunities linked to the market of environmental services. It benefitted larger landowners 
in a more than proportional manner, a fact that precluded it from being simultaneously a poverty alleviation 
program. The conclusion is that the program, if targeted more precisely at small landowners, can serve as a 
model for comparable forest protection policies in developing countries, reducing deforestation rates, changing 
land uses and expanding forest cover, besides mitigating rural poverty.
Keywords: economic policy instruments; poverty alleviation; deforestation; Costa Rica; payment for environ-
mental services.
RESUMO: O Programa de Pagamentos por Serviços Ambientais (PESP) da Costa Rica foi lançado em 1997. Trata-se de 
uma política orientada para o mercado que visa estimular a conservação de florestas por meio de pagamentos 
feitos diretamente a donos de terras que optam voluntariamente por não se engajar em ações de desmatamento 
ou que se engajam em ações de recuperação florestal ou de plantios de árvores. Este artigo focaliza os conceitos 
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básicos do programa e no seu desempenho em seus primeiros anos, usando como bases dados publicados pela 
gerência do programa e um número restrito dos numerosos textos que analisam e avaliam essa experiência 
pioneira em PSA. Os achados mostram que o programa conseguiu reverter um quadro agudo de desmatamento 
que vinha ocorrendo desde a década de 1960; entre 1997 e 2003, aproximadamente, contribuiu até para uma 
expansão líquida da área florestada do país. Além disso, ele corrigiu falhas de mercado e criou oportunidades 
para transações ligadas ao mercado de serviços ambientais. Foi constatado ainda que os maiores donos de terra 
engajados no programa foram beneficiados de uma forma mais do que proporcional aos seus números e que 
isso impediu que o programa assumisse o caráter simultâneo de mitigação da pobreza rural. A conclusão é que 
o programa, se direcionado com maior precisão para os pequenos proprietários de terra, é justificadamente 
adotado como referência e modelo para políticas comparáveis de proteção florestal em países em desenvol-
vimento, reduzindo os índices de desmatamento, mudando usos da terra, expandindo a cobertura florestal e 
mitigando a pobreza rural.
Palavras-chave: instrumentos econômicos; mitigação da pobreza; desmatamento; Costa Rica; pagamento por 
serviços ambientais.
1. Introduction – a new forest protection policy
In the 1960s and 1970s, Costa Rica had one of the 
highest rates of deforestation in the world (Rosero-Bixby 
& Poloni, 1998, p. 2). Since 1969, however, a new set 
of policies and regulations has evolved into direct mea-
sures, resulting in a substantial reduction of those rates. 
By the early 2000s, Costa Rica recorded an auspicious 
net gain in forest cover (FAO, 2005, p. 200). A key tool 
for reaching such a result was the creation, in 1969, of 
a system of public protected areas (herein referred to as 
SINAC), in which logging is strictly prohibited (Ulate, 
1997, p. 25). 
However, as 75.7% of Costa Rica’s forests are 
privately owned (FAO, 2005, p. 206), the Costa Rican 
government had to create policies to tackle logging 
in private lands. For this purpose, it created a system 
of incentives for conservation and forestry activities, 
including a program of direct payments made to private 
landowners in exchange for the provision of environ-
mental services by the forests they choose to maintain 
on their properties. The origins and early performance 
of this program are the major topics of this article. It 
became the major precursor of more recent and widely 
publicized programs that fall under the general name 
of “Payments for Environmental Services” – PES, now 
adopted in several countries. Since 1997, Costa Rica’s 
“Programa de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales” (herein 
referred to as PESP - Payment for Environmental Ser-
vices Program) has succeeded in protecting 599,061.50 
ha, 23 per cent of Costa Rica’s total forested area of 
2,391,000 ha).2 (FONAFIFO, 2007)
This article reviews part of the analytical literature 
about economic instruments used in the early years of 
Costa Rica’s PESP. It also examines official and unof-
ficial data presented in several case studies that focus on 
those early years. Information from the program’s site 
on the Internet was also used. The focus fell upon types 
of payments, numbers of beneficiaries, and the equity 
of payments (given the differences among beneficiaries 
in terms of the sizes of their land holdings and of family 
income).  It also emphasizes three important aspects of 
the program: institutional complexity and strengthening, 
economic impacts for beneficiaries, and environmental 
consequences. This research seeks to help understand 
PESP’s success in its early years, in terms of the protec-
tion and recovery of forest cover. This may help assess 
its relevance as a reference or model for similar natural 
resource protection programs in other countries. 
The pertinent literature argues that the forest 
conservation and recovery program in Costa Rica was 
successful for two main reasons: (i) it changed the 
2 General information about the program, including data on numbers of applications, monetary disbursements and the amount of areas included 
in the program until 2009 can be found in  http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_estadisticas.htm, June 26 2014.
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predominant use of forested lands from clear cutting to 
conservation, and (ii) legal improvements and increased 
institutional strength allowed adequate PESP imple-
mentation. The literature also argues that PESP has two 
weaknesses: (i) it benefits landowners who would prob-
ably protect natural resources in their lands even if PESP 
did not exist, and (ii) it does not give priority to small 
and medium land-owners and to forest-dependent com-
munities, as it was conceived to do when it was created, 
since a large proportion of the actual payments goes to 
large landowners. Besides critically examining the two 
reasons for success and the first of the aforementioned 
weaknesses, we point out that the second shortcoming 
barred the program from attaining the additional and 
socially relevant status of a poverty mitigation strategy. 
This article has five sections, the first one being 
this introduction. The second one discusses briefly the 
literature about economic instruments for conservation. 
The third section provides a profile of Costa Rica’s 
deforestation control strategies. The fourth section 
examines how legal improvements and institutional 
strengthening contributed to the success of PESP and 
to the decline of deforestation rates. Lastly, the fifth 
section discusses the limitations and the potentials of 
PESP – and PES programs in general - as an instrument 
for poverty mitigation. 
2. Economic instruments for conservation 
purposes
There are three basic types of policies to avoid 
or mitigate the negative environmental impacts of pro-
ductive activities: command-and-control regulations, 
economic or market-based instruments, and educational 
instruments (Romeiro, 2003; Palm & Larsson, 2007). 
Command-and-control instruments are straightforward 
regulations that must be followed by polluters - stan-
dards, rules, bans, procedures and controls. Sanctions 
apply if rules are not observed (Lustosa et al., 2003). 
Economic or market-based instruments are “regulations 
that encourage behavior through market signals rather 
than through explicit directives regarding pollution con-
trol levels or methods” (Stavins, 2002, p. 1). Educational 
or informative instruments form a broad set of policies 
and practices that fall under the heading of environmental 
education, in which relevant information on the avoid-
ance and the mitigation of environmental problems is 
provided to the general population or to targeted social 
groups, with the hope of altering their behavior patterns.
Classical economic theory states that the scarcity 
of a product leads to the increase of its price, thus bal-
ancing its supply and demand. In theory, the scarcity of 
certain environmental goods could be compensated by 
these increased prices, leading to their moderate use or 
even to their substitution by abundant materials (when 
feasible). Nevertheless, market mechanisms tend to fail 
to regulate supply and demand of environmental goods 
and services not generated by human labor, causing de-
mand to outstrip the supply of non-renewable goods and 
even the regenerative capability of renewable resources. 
Examples abound – biodiversity, agricultural soils, and 
the capacity of forests to produce oxygen and remove 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. These items are not 
tradable in traditional markets, because they are public 
goods. They are not attributable to human labor or invest-
ments and thus their economic value is hard to define in a 
market setting. Community or government intervention 
is therefore required to correct these market failures and 
to establish and/or increase the prices of environmental 
goods and services, so that they will remain available to 
present and future generations (Daly, 1996).
Although environmental economists and eco-
logical economists disagree among themselves about 
the viability of technological and scientific solutions 
for natural resource constraints, they agree on a crucial 
point - it is important to create a regulatory structure 
based on economic incentives to guarantee efficiency 
in the use of natural resources (Romeiro, 2003). Many 
governments have tried different instruments that seek 
to reduce the negative impacts of modern industry and 
agriculture on the environment. The Costa Rican govern-
ment, for example, uses several economic instruments, 
such as pollution taxes, subsidies, marketable permits 
and performance bonds. They seek to realign market 
signals and promote environmentally responsible be-
havior (MINAE, 2002). 
Payments for environmental services – PES is a 
financial mechanism that acknowledges and rewards 
the environmental services provided by ecosystems 
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to society at large (Wunder, 2005). The two main 
principles of PES are: (1) providers of environmental 
services should be compensated and (2) recipients of 
those services should pay for them. Costa Rica’s PESP, 
for example, has achieved a significant degree of success 
in stimulating forest conservation in privately owned 
lands. It compensates landowners financially for the 
environmental services generated by their privately 
owned forests (Wunder, 2005). 
Ferraro & Kiss (2002) state that a direct approach 
such as PES is more effective than conserving biodiver-
sity in public protected areas or indirect investments, 
such as subsidies or fiscal incentives. We maintain that 
this mechanism may have a secondary - but not less 
important - goal: mitigation of poverty, specifically rural 
poverty. To achieve both goals, PES must target areas 
characterized by both (i) a high risk of degradation and 
(ii) a significant volume of environmental services and 
goods, especially in places where low income or small 
landowners are potential beneficiaries. This research 
examines these issues as they appear in the context of 
Costa Rica’s PESP.
As a pioneering policy instrument for payments for 
environmental services, Costa Rica’s PESP has attracted 
wide attention among scholars, policy makers, coopera-
tion agencies, managers etc. It also has influenced policy 
discussions and decisions in several countries. Because 
we focus on certain aspects of the early years of PESP’s 
implementation, our goal is neither a comprehensive 
examination of PESP’s origins, nor of its overall per-
formance to date.
Pagiola (2006) focused on analysing PESP’s early 
years. A representative example of more comprehensive 
approaches to the study of PESP is Le Coq et al. (2012).3 
The authors examine the emergence of Costa Rican forest 
law 7,575, attributing it to a combination of four factors – 
local awareness of the severity of deforestation, existence 
of earlier forest policies that generated well structured 
interest groups, circulation of Costa Rican nationals and 
international environmental policy networks, and the 
existence of “policy entrepreneurs” who were able to 
pull together local and international ideas and proposals 
and to insert them in a new policy framework. Our study 
acknowledges the second factor and suggests that some 
of the more powerful interest groups may have been re-
sponsible for PESP’s biased disbursement record, which 
favored medium- and large-scale landowners.
A recent paper, written by Aguilar-Støen et al. 
(2013), links PES programs in Costa Rica and Colombia 
to emerging REDD and REDD+ proposals and programs 
in the same countries. It is based on thorough research on 
several pertinent governance dimensions of PES, REDD 
and REDD+ (particularly the inclusion of poorer farmers 
and indigenous peoples). It focuses also on the ways that 
these programs relate to each other in the simultaneous 
goals of preserving existing native forest cover and 
reaching net gains in the area of forested lands (native, 
secondary and planted/managed). 
Another recent collection of studies about PES and 
REDD was published in a dossier in 2013.4 The focus 
is mainly on PES initiatives and proposals in several 
locations of the Brazilian territory. Nonetheless, several 
articles use and describe Costa Rica’s PESP as an inspira-
tion for similar experiences in Brazil or as a reference for 
comparative analysis. The article by the dossier editors 
(Eloy et al., 2013) may be cited for the close attention 
it gives to Costa Rica’s PESP. Pereira (2010) is a quite 
critical study of two PES programs in the Bolivian and 
Brazilian Amazon regions also strongly referenced to 
the Costa Rican experience. The author warns that these 
programs may be affected by perceived PESP shortcom-
ings, such as bringing only limited benefits to rural and 
forest dwellers and promoting the interests of govern-
ment agencies and segments of local elites. 
3. Costa Rica’s conservation strategies: PESP’s 
contribution to the control of deforestation 
The Costa Rican national territory has a total area 
of 5,106,000 ha. In 2010, 2,605,000 ha were classified as 
forested lands (51.01 percent). Total forest cover oscil-
3 This article is part of a dossier published in the same issue of the journal VertigO, under the title “Émergence et mise en politique des services 
environnementaux et écosystémiques”. An expanded version of this study, including different authors, is Le Coq et al. (2011).
4 The title of the dossier is “Pagamentos por Serviços Ambientais no Brasil” [Payments for Environmental Services in Brazil], edited by Emilie 
Coudel, Fabiano Toni, Ludivine Eloy. See Sustentabilidade em Debate, 4(1), 17-159 (2013).
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lated slightly between 1990 and 2005 - from 2,564,000 
ha to 2,491,000 ha, increasing to 2,605,000 in 1990, 
2005 and 2010, respectively. However, the annual rate 
of deforestation changed from 19,000 ha/year in 1990-
2000 to a positive reforestation rate of 3,000 ha/year 
in 2000-2005 and in 2006-2010. Between 2000 and 
2005, no primary forests were cut; the area dedicated to 
agriculture increased in only 1,000 ha.5 Between 1990 
and 2010, the country lost a yearly average of 2,050 ha 
of forests, or just 0.08%. For the same period, however, 
Costa Rica gained 1.6% in its total forest cover, or around 
41,000 ha (about 2,000 ha per year) (Butler, 2014; FAO, 
2005). The government’s conservation and reforestation 
efforts played a major role in this transition from forest 
loss to forest recovery. 
Over the last 40 years, four laws affected Costa 
Rica’s forest protection and management policies: Laws 
4,465/1969, 7,032/1986, 7,174/1990 and 7,575/1996 
(MINAE, 2002, p. 4). The first law created a system 
of protected public areas (Ulate, 1997, p. 25). It placed 
1,279,886 ha under protection, about 25 percent of the 
national territory that nowadays corresponds to public 
protected areas (COSTA RICA, 2007, p. 377). Laws 
7,032/1986 and 7,174/1990 defined rules for forest 
management and reforestation on private lands. Law 
7,032 created a federal forest agency to supervise for-
estry activities, such as management and plantations. 
In 1996, Law 7,575 defined this agency as the National 
Forestry Financing Fund (referred here as FONAFIFO6). 
FONAFIFO’s history and missions are discussed later 
in this article. 
2005 data showed that 75.7 percent of forested 
Costa Rica lands and 60 percent of lands covered by other 
woody vegetation were privately owned (FAO, 2005, p. 
206), a situation that seems to have changed little since. 
This indicates the significance of Costa Rica’s strategy 
to encourage reforestation and conservation specifically 
in private properties. 
Like other developing countries in Latin America, 
Costa Rica’s economy in the past was based mainly on 
the production of primary commodities aimed at foreign 
markets. Historically it experienced high deforestation 
rates. During the 1970s and early 1980s, vast sections 
of its rainforests were still being burned and converted 
into croplands and pastures.7 After 1992, the importance 
of agriculture, cattle ranching and timber harvesting 
decreased, while other economic activities, such as eco-
tourism, increased (MINAE, 2002, p. 5). 
The relation between deforestation and productive 
activities is telling. Although the findings by Rosero-Bix-
by and Palloni about the relationship between population 
growth and deforestation in Costa Rica between 1973 
and 1983 are not conclusive, they provide insight about 
the matter. They found that “land tenure and relations of 
production are important for the population-deforestation 
connection” (Rosero-Bixby & Palloni, 1998, p. 17). They 
could not demonstrate the direct impact of population 
growth on forest loss, but showed that both are indi-
rectly related, as population growth demands increasing 
amounts of natural resources, making resource output 
grow at the same rate. 
Persson & Munasighe (1995, p. 263) examined 
how public policies can help control deforestation. They 
blame four activities for most of the deforestation in 
Costa Rica: logging, banana plantations, cattle ranching, 
and squatting. Together with market failures, government 
negligence, property rights issues and unemployment 
(Persson & Munasighe, 1995, p. 260), these activities 
compose an ideal formula for environmental devasta-
tion. The results of a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model applied by the authors indicated that cor-
recting the market would reduce deforestation. This is 
what Costa Rica’s government did since 1997, when it 
launched PESP, at a relatively early moment in the still 
recent global history of tropical forest protection efforts.
The Costa Rican government interprets payments 
for environmental services as a financial retribution 
to private landowners who preserve environmental 
goods and services by maintaining or enlarging forest 
cover on their lands8 (FONAFIFO, 2008). According 
5 http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Costa_Rica.htm, June 26 2014.
6 The acronym comes from its name in Spanish - Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal – FONAFIFO.
7 http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20costarica.htm, June 26 2014.
8 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/servicios_ambientales.htm,  June 26 2014.
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to FONAFIFO, the program’s most important feature 
is that the 1996 Forest Law replaced concepts such 
as “subsidy” (tax reductions), used to finance forestry 
activities since 1979, with the concept of “economic 
acknowledgment” of environmental services provided 
through forest conservation9 (FONAFIFO, 2008). The 
government has stated that the difference between the 
two approaches is that the new one rewards financially 
owners for conserving forests, while the former one 
sought to stimulate irresponsible forest management. At 
the same time, Rojas & Aylward (2003, p. 98) noted that 
PESP “seems to be a continuation of the subsidy scheme 
to the forestry sector”, since landowners are allowed to 
engage in logging if they choose to abandon the program 
when PESP contracts expire. 
PESP considers environmental goods as those 
products that can be consumed or commercialized by 
humans, such as timber, fruits, seeds, medicines etc. 
Environmental services are those provided by the abil-
ity of healthy ecosystems to generate those goods.10 The 
services targeted by PESP are mitigation of greenhouse 
effect gases, carbon sequestration, protection of water 
resources, protection of biodiversity, and provision of 
scenic beauty (MINAE, 2002, p. 39). These are the same 
types of environmental services identified by Wunder 
(2005). 
Initially, PESP adopted three types of contracts: 
forest protection, forest management, and reforestation 
through plantations. In 2003, MINAE discontinued for-
est management contracts. This was in part influenced 
by the critique made by The Costa Rican Federation 
for Nature Conservation (FECON), which argued that 
a profitable activity, such as forest management, should 
not receive payments for environmental services and that 
PESP should be directed mainly at forest conservation 
(COSTA RICA, 2002, p. 245). In the same year, PESP 
created a new type of contract - agroforestry systems 
would receive a financial reward for each tree planted 
(instead of the area protected, as in the other PESP 
contracts). The decision to accept agroforestry systems 
in PESP seems to us inconsistent with the exclusion of 
forest management, because both are profitable activi-
ties. Nonetheless, agroforestry systems continued to be 
supported by PESP.
Since 2006, reforestation projects were divided 
into three sub-categories: reforestation with native spe-
cies, natural recovery of productive areas, and natural 
recovery of pastures (FONAFIFO, 2007). Another 
interesting change came about after 2000, when early 
policy evaluations pointed to the fact that indigenous 
communities and women were underprivileged groups 
that should become PESP beneficiaries. Accordingly, 
they became special targets for PESP initiatives (Carvajal 
et al., 2003, p. 10).
According to the PESP manual, individuals and 
small to medium landowners’ associations can benefit 
from payments. To access PESP, applicants must submit 
a written petition describing the beneficiaries, the area 
(size and location) and the desired contract type. A de-
tailed management plan drafted by a licensed forester is 
also required (FONAFIFO, 2003, p. 4, 6). Every year, 
the government defines the total funding for PESP: the 
amount available for each type of contract, the amount 
paid for each planted tree in agro-forestry systems or 
for each hectare protected or reforested, the length of 
the contracts, number of payments to be made, priority 
areas, and deadlines for submissions. (MINAE. Decree 
31,081/2003; Decree 31,767/2004; Decree 32,226/2005; 
Decree 32,226/2006; Decree 33,852/2007; Decree 
34,371/2008). 
Priority areas vary for each kind of contract, cov-
ering a wide range of land uses. Since 2006, areas for 
reforestation are selected preferably among those with 
a high potential for plantations or those with expired 
reforestation agreements funded by the government. 
Areas that have low “Social Development Index” scores 
(less than 40 percent) are also eligible. Since 1997, areas 
labeled as “Kyoto lands” (deforested before 1990) have 
received special consideration – they have gained priority 
for being selected for reforestation with native species. 
When the major goal is protection, priority is given to 
biological corridors, watersheds, private lands within 
public conservation areas, areas with low “Social De-
velopment Index” scores, and areas benefited by expired 
9 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_concepto.htm, June 26 2014.
10 http://www.sirefor.go.cr/serviciosambientales.html, June 26 2014.
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protection contracts with PESP. Also worthy of priority 
status are agroforestry projects designed by producers’ 
associations that hold valid contracts with FONAFIFO 
to work on lands with poor soils. (MINAE. Decree 
32,226/2006; Decree 33,852/2007; Decree 34,371/2008; 
FONAFIFO, 2006; MAG-MIRENEM, 1995).
In the mid 2000s, PESP was paying US$ 320 
per protected hectare, US$ 816 per reforested hectare, 
US$ 816 per hectare of naturally regenerated produc-
tive soil,11 US$ 205 per hectare of naturally recovered 
pastures, and US$ 1.30 per planted tree in agro-forestry 
systems.12 FONAFIFO can pay other amounts, depend-
ing on specific agreements with donors (MINAE. Decree 
31,081/2003; Decree 31,767/2004; Decree 32,226/2006; 
Decree 33,852/2007; Decree 34,371/2008). 
The 2007 PESP manual (FONAFIFO, 2007) de-
fined that the minimum area for reforestation projects is 
1 ha/year and the maximum is 300 ha/year; for reforesta-
tion projects submitted by small and medium landowner 
associations, the maximum is 50 ha/year for each prop-
erty; for forest protection, the minimum is 2 ha/year and 
the maximum is 300 ha/year; for natural regeneration of 
productive areas and pastures, the minimum is 2 ha, with 
no maximum; for agro-forestry systems, the minimum 
is 350 planted trees and the maximum is 3,500 trees, per 
beneficiary. In 2010, the minimum and maximum areas 
were still the same (see Table 1).
The monetary values found in the last column were 
estimated by PESP policy designers and managers on 
the basis of (i) the market values of logs from different 
species of trees (either planted, naturally recovering, or 
native), in combination with (ii) the average market val-
ues of land. Of course, in the case of pasture recovery on 
deforested lands, only the second criteria is applicable. 
Individual contracts specified single-objective protection 
measures and payment values were based on this option. 
If individual landowners took out more than what the 
contract stipulated, indicating commitment to multiple 
protection measures (our data did not confirm that this 
happened), we did not find information about how this 
affected computations of the values to be paid to them. 
According to basic PESP documents, contracts 
usually last five years, with the possibility of exten-
sion for five more years. In 2006, agroforestry systems 
contracts were being signed exceptionally for periods of 
three years. Another exception is adopted for reforesta-
tion projects, which can be implemented for a maximum 
of 15 years, as they demand more time to achieve results 
(MINAE. Decree 34,371/2008).
Disbursements to beneficiaries are made in annual 
payments, according to each category of PESP and to 
the year in which the agreements were signed. Protection 
and natural regeneration contracts settled in 2006, for 
example, received 20 percent of the total amounts due 
TABLE 1 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Minimum and Maximum Areas or Number of Trees Supported and Respective Amounts Paid, per Type of 
Contract, 2007-2010
type of contract minimum maximum amount paid
agro-forestry systems 350 trees 3,500 trees 1.30 USD/tree
protection 2 ha 300 ha 320 USD/ha
reforestation
with native species 1 ha 300 ha 816 USD/ha
natural recovery of productive areas 2 ha --- 816 USD/ha
natural recovery of pastures 2 ha --- 205 USD/ha
projects submitted by small 
and medium landowners’ 
associations
----
50 ha for each 
property
816 USD/ha 
or* 
205 USD/ha
*Depending on type of reforestation.
SOURCE: FONAFIFO, 2007.
11 Except in 2006, when FONAFIFO paid US$ 205,00 per hectare of naturally regenerated productive soil.
12 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_estadisticas.htm, June 26 2014.
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per year, for five consecutive years. In the same year, 
reforestation projects received 46 percent of payments 
upfront and should receive the rest at the rate of 6 percent 
annually, from the second to the tenth year. Agroforestry 
systems contracts signed in 2006 received 65 percent 
of the total amounts upfront in the first year, 20 percent 
in 2007 and 15 percent in 200813 (FONAFIFO, 2008).
Regarding the distribution of contracts per type, 
the largest percentage was dedicated to protection (73.8 
percent). Plantations are by far the least numerous type 
of contract. Geographically, contracts have a fairly 
decentralized distribution. The region of Arenal-Huetar 
Norte holds the largest share of contracts (21.6 percent), 
followed by the Volcanic Central Area (15.5 percent) and 
the Tempisque region (12.6 percent). These data refer to 
1998-2001 (see Table 2).
In its early years, PESP was generally regarded as a 
successful and efficient initiative for the reduction of de-
forestation in private lands (Carvajal et al., 2003; Miranda 
et al., 2003; Snider et al., 2003; De Man, 2004; Tomaselli, 
2004; Hope et al., 2005; Kosoy et al., 2005; Zbinden & 
Lee, 2005; Pagiola, 2006). The demand for contracts has 
been steady. On May 20, 2008, FONAFIFO published 
cumulative data for all contracts signed between 1997 
and 2007 – there were 7,242 PES contracts; 1,945,552 
trees were planted; 531,959.50 ha were protected and 
39,036 ha were reforested. Forest management contracts, 
discontinued in 2002, benefited 28,066 ha (FONAFIFO, 
2008) (see more relevant data in Table 3).
13 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_estadisticas.htm, June 26th, 2014.
TABLE 2 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Number of Contracts, by Area and Type, 1998-2001
area management plantations protection reforestation total (%)
Amistad-Caribe 11 0 174 26 211 12
Arenal-Huetar Norte 91 1 211 75 378 21.6
Amistad Pacífico 0 0 104 11 115 6.6
Arenal Tilarán 0 0 84 9 93 5.3
Guanacaste 11 2 62 2 77 4.4
Osa 19 0 146 5 139 9.7
Pacífico Central 1 1 103 28 212 7.7
Tempisque 0 7 129 46 92 12.1
Tortuguero 10 4 75 3 271 5.3
Volcánica Central 36 2 175 58 17 15.5
total 179 17 1,293 263 1,752
SOURCE: Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 15).
TABLE 3 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Distribution of the Areas Affected by Contracts, by Year and by Category, 1997-2007.
year protectionarea (ha)
management
area (ha)
reforestation
area (ha)
total
area (ha)
agroforestry
(planted trees)
number of 
contracts
1997 88,830 9,325 4,629 102,784 - 1,200
1998 47,804 7,620 4,173 59,916 - 597
1999 55,776 5,125 3,156 64,781 - 622
2000 26,583 - 2,457 29,040 - 271
2001 20,629 3,997 3,281 27,907 - 287
2002 21,819 1,999 1,108 24,904 - 279
2003 65,405 - 3,155 68,765 97,381 672
2004 71,081 - 1,557 72,638 412,558 760
2005 53,493 - 3,602 57,095 513,684 755
2006 19,972 - 4,866 24,838 380,398 619
2007 60,567 - 5,826 66,393 541,531 1,180
total 531,959 28,066 39,036        532,688           1,945,552 7,242
SOURCE: FONAFIFO, 2008.
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It is clear that PESP made a significant contribu-
tion to maintain and restore forest cover in Costa Rica. 
While the SINAC covers 53.72 percent of the forested 
area and 25.15 percent of the country’s territory (SINAC, 
2008), PESP was able to preserve and/or revitalize an 
additional 25 percent of the country’s forested area and 
11.73 percent of its territory. Along with lower defores-
tation rates, these figures show PESP’s positive effects. 
PESP and SINAC are not the only policies respon-
sible for the sharp fall of deforestation rates in Costa Rica 
(FAO, 2005, p. 200). The national government points 
out that forestry management plans imposed on private 
landowners and other financial incentives given to 
forestry related activities (income tax deductions, loans 
with reduced interest, funds to benefit municipalities 
and organizations, bonds and debentures), discontinued 
after PESP was launched, also contributed to revert the 
intense rate of deforestation recorded in the 1960s and 
1970s (MINAE, 2002). 
4. The role of institutional strengthening and 
innovation in governance
North (1990) and Williamson (1996) have been 
widely influential in calling attention to the societal 
gains achieved in many fields by means of institutional 
organization and improvement and by the establishment 
of proper governance mechanisms. Even a cursory ex-
amination of these matters shows that PESP was accom-
panied by major changes in the institutional framework 
and governance connected to land-use planning, forestry 
management, and conservation.  Since 1969, when its 
first Forest Law was published and its General Forest 
Council (Dirección General Forestal) was created, Costa 
Rica has improved its forestry management system. New 
public policies and innovative financial mechanisms 
were created and applied. As a result of the significant 
changes in society’s perceptions of management and con-
servation of natural resources, Costa Rica experienced 
extensive changes in its legislation, in its institutional 
structure and in the way governments address market 
failures (MINAE, 2002). This, of course, created a favor-
able political and institutional environment for PESP and 
other environmental policies and programs. 
As legislation and agencies were renewed to 
manage an improved forestry system, both the private 
and public sectors became aware of the need to create 
specific mechanisms for government intervention in the 
economy, in order to revert the weak competitive edge 
of small producers in the face of agribusiness14 (MINAE, 
2008). Over the last decades, the government has spent 
a lot of energy in the regulation of forest management, 
reforestation, tree plantations, agroforestry systems, 
timber harvesting and the extraction of non-wood forest 
products. It also created the SINAC and it introduced 
new communication channels and new public institutions 
to connect with the private sector and with society at 
large to guarantee that stakeholders’ interests were taken 
into account. In addition, it discontinued tax exemptions 
for the timber industry and created a specific agency and 
new instruments to raise and channel funds for forest 
related activities (MINAE, 2002).
The more recent chapter of policy improvement 
represented by FONAFIFO and the current Costa Rican 
forestry financing system dates back to the year 1990, 
with Law 7,174. Its article 24 allowed the creation of 
trust funds to finance forest related activities conducted 
by the private sector.15 The Fondo Nacional de Financia-
miento Forestal - the trust fund FONAFIFO, was created 
in 1991, based on article 32 of Law 7,216. On April 16, 
1996, article 46 of Law 7,575 defined FONAFIFO’s du-
ties and consolidated it as the national forest authority 
(MINAE, 2008).16 It is a decentralized body within the 
Ministry of the Environment and Energy (Ministerio de 
Ambiente y Energia – MINAE). FONAFIFO has rela-
tive autonomy and an instrumental status. Its structure 
includes a governing board and an executive unit; two 
representatives from the private sector and three from 
the public sector, holding two-year terms, compose its 
board (FONAFIFO, 2008).17
14 http://www.minae.go.cr/dependencias/desconcentradas/fondo_nacional_financiamiento_forestal.html, September 15 2008. 
15 http://www.minae.go.cr/dependencias/desconcentradas/fondo_nacional_financiamiento_forestal.html, September 15 2008. 
16 http://www.minae.go.cr/dependencias/desconcentradas/fondo_nacional_financiamiento_forestal.html, September 15 2008. 
17 http://www.fonafifo.com/english.html, January 24 2013.
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In 1997, FONAFIFO launched PESP, which soon 
became its primary activity (FONAFIFO, 2008).18 
FONAFIFO manages - through Costa Rica’s National 
Bank - several funds related to PESP: Environmental 
Services Certificates, Huetar Norte Forestry Program, 
EcoMarkets and REFORESTA. The Environmental 
Services Certificates fund is a financial instrument 
from which FONAFIFO receives resources for PESP, 
voluntarily provided by different kinds of private com-
panies, in exchange for a certificate. The companies 
benefit from having their names linked to FONAFIFO 
and PESP. Businesses quite distinct from each other, 
such as the Reserva Conchal Hotel, the sugar manufac-
turer Azucarera El Viejo S.A., the melon producers and 
exporters Costeña S.A., the Exporpak S.A., the airline 
company Nature Air and many others joined the pro-
gram. Companies can choose to place their money in 
the region from which they receive their environmental 
services or invest in the conservation of forests in general 
(FONAFIFO, 2008).19 
The Huetar Norte Forestry Program is funded by 
the German government, through the Kreditanstaslt für 
Wiedderaufbau (KfW Bankengruppe). It co-finances 
70% of PESP, specifically in the Conservation Area 
of Huetar Norte and the Sarapiqui Subregion of the 
Central Volcanic Mountain Range Conservation Area 
(FONAFIFO, 2008).20
The EcoMarkets fund receives money from the 
Costa Rican government, based on a loan agreement 
with the World Bank and on donations from the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Japanese govern-
ment. It helps fund PESP and covers its administration, 
coordination, development and maintenance of infor-
mation systems and field supervision. The expanded 
participation of women and indigenous peoples in PESP 
is among the goals pursued by EcoMarkets. 
Unlike EcoMarkets, REFORESTA is not a source 
of financing. It is an example of indirect intervention in 
the forestry market. It aims to finance the development 
of new wood products, for the purpose of widening their 
scope and stimulating commercial forest plantations. The 
Japanese government and the World Bank give financial 
support to this program.21 
These funds assure a flow of financial resources 
that cover PESP’s direct payments to beneficiaries. 
They also assist and support FONAFIFO’s technical and 
administrative structure. As happens with other projects 
involving foreign, intergovernmental or international 
funding, possible constraints in the flow of foreign funds 
may have affected PESP’s ability to operate. However, 
we did not find indications that this happened in its early 
years.  The national government consolidated PESP 
institutions and regulations. Though PESP ultimately 
achieved its goal of controlling deforestation and expand-
ing the country’s forest cover, in its early years, at least, 
it did not achieve its goal of providing selective benefits 
to small and medium landowners.22
5. PESP - a poverty alleviation instrument?
The last matter to be examined is PESP’s potential 
to generate social, economic and environmental benefits, 
both directly and indirectly, particularly in the form of 
poverty alleviation. Direct benefits are quite straight-
forward: Financial disbursements made to land owners 
in exchange for the environmental services that their 
forests provide. The sums received by beneficiaries of 
course have a wide range of significance in relation to 
their other sources of income. Such payments are at the 
heart of the PES concept. 
Indirect benefits include other financial and non-
financial benefits received by individuals, communities 
and landowners. These benefits, although not necessarily 
accrued by all beneficiaries, are varied and widespread. 
The building of social capital among poorer beneficia-
ries, for example, is an usual outcome of the institutional 
improvements and participatory mechanisms linked to 
18 http://www.fonafifo.com/english.html, January 24 2013.
19 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/invierta_bosques/e_ib_invierta_en_bosques.htm,  June 26 2014.
20 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/proyectos/e_pr_kfw.htm, June 26 2014.
21 http://www.fonafifo.com/paginas_espanol/proyectos/e_pr_reforesta.htm, June 26 2014.
22 http://www.fonafifo.com/index.html, accessed on June 262014.
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PES programs. Additionally, access to PES programs 
through collective contracts, adopted right after the early 
years of PESP, substantially reduced red-tape procedures 
and other transaction costs that affected the Costa Rican 
poor more than proportionally. When PESP let go of the 
requirement of land entitlement documents to be admit-
ted in the program it also created indirect benefits for 
the rural poor. One last example to be cited here as an 
indirect benefit is the provision of credit for investments 
required for fulfilling PES contracts. This is especially 
relevant for reforestation contracts, in which landowners 
need to make early investments in equipment, seedlings 
and machinery (Miranda et al., 2003).23
Although the ultimate goal of PESP is to promote 
forest protection (MINAE, 2002, p. 39), FONAFIFO 
states that it was designed “to benefit small and medium-
sized landowners” (FONAFIFO, 2008)24. Unfortunately, 
despite this statement and PESP’s potential to fulfill it, 
the program has not been managed as a poverty mitiga-
tion tool, as attested by several case studies that examined 
its early years (Carvajal et al., 2003; Miranda et al., 2003; 
Snider et al., 2003; De Man, 2004; Hope et al., 2005; 
Kosoy et al., 2005; Zbinden & Lee, 2005).
It is significant that no comprehensive official 
data regarding specifically PESP’s socioeconomic ef-
fects have been released to date. The only sources of 
information about these effects are a handful of field 
studies based on small samples of PESP beneficiaries, 
undertaken by specialists who focused on the first years 
of the program. They were funded mostly by interna-
tional organizations, such as the International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED) and the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) (Carvajal et al., 2003; Miranda et al., 2003; 
Zbinden & Lee, 2005). We will examine their argu-
ments and findings, specifically in relation to the issue 
of poverty alleviation.
In 2002, Miranda et al. (2003) conducted a sur-
vey with a sample of 46 landowners, of whom 32 were 
receiving payments for environmental services and 14 
were not. The sample was randomly selected in the Vir-
illa watershed, located in the Central Volcanic Mountain 
Range Conservation Area. Several positive PESP side 
effects were recorded by the survey: protection against 
squatters; creation of technical and professional posts 
in forest related activities; provision of technical assis-
tance; training in agro-conservation and management; 
environmental education, specially for children; support 
to community organization and networking; capacity 
building in solid waste management; aquifer protection, 
and recovery of degraded areas (Miranda et al., 2003, p. 
27-38). This is a quite impressive array of side benefits. 
However, we are interested here in the direct financial 
benefits, in order to assess if PESP is working as a direct 
instrument of poverty mitigation.
Miranda et al. (2003) showed that the living stan-
dards of interviewed landowners benefitted by PESP are 
“relatively high”, although this finding is not necessarily 
valid for the bulk of its beneficiaries. They found that 64 
percent of landholders with less than 10 ha did not access 
PESP, while 100 percent of landowners with properties 
over 80 ha did. For medium size properties (from 11 to 
80 ha), the figure for beneficiaries in the sample was 75 
percent (see Table 4).
Although the findings of Miranda et al. (2003) 
are not necessarily valid for the national scale, their 
study provides telling figures about PESP beneficiaries. 
Because payments are computed by area, 17 small and 
medium landowners (properties with less than 81 ha) 
received only 6.92 percent of the total benefits, while 15 
landowners with properties larger than 81 ha received 
around 93 percent.
Another regional sample, studied by De Man 
(2004), reached similar findings. PESP contracts in the 
Aranjuez watershed did not favor small landowners 
because most payments were made to “large landown-
ers”. De Man noted that the obstacles to a more inclusive 
program in that region are complex. The expensive bu-
reaucratic procedures required to enroll in the program 
and to gain access to detailed information are barriers 
23 See also Stefano Pagiola, Agustin Arcenas, and Gunars Platais,  Ensuring that the Poor Benefit from Payments for Environmental Services . 
Environment Department, World Bank  [draft]. 2003. Available at http://moderncms.ecosystemmarketplace.com/repository/moderncms_docu-
ments/Pagiola,Arcenas,Platais%20%20EnsuringBenifitsPoor.pdf, Ocotber 15 2014.
24 http://www.fonafifo.com, accessed on June 26 2014.
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to entry. This is not uncommon in PES projects and in 
several kinds of community-based or “demonstration” 
projects” targeted at local development and/or envi-
ronmental protection. Benefits tend to accrue to well 
informed, better-organized and better-connected actors. 
In addition, middlemen give priority to large landown-
ers because they charge a percentage of the payment for 
helping them with bureaucratic demands. Since 2003, 
however, access became easier, because land titles 
ceased to be a requirement for soliciting PESP benefits 
(Carvajal et al., 2003, p. iii). This “inclusive” measure 
allowed thousands of generally poorer untitled landown-
ers all over the country to become PESP beneficiaries, 
broadening the area under protection and the social reach 
of the program.
The survey conducted by Miranda et al. (2003) 
provides also important information about how PESP 
impacts income distribution among farmers (Miranda 
et al., 2003, p. 25). For most beneficiaries (93 percent), 
PESP payments are the second or even the third most 
important source of income; only 6 percent have these 
payments as their main source of income. For larger 
landowners, the main sources of income are livestock 
(31 percent), other professional activities (28 percent) 
and commerce (22 percent). In short, 59 percent of the 
main sources of income of PESP beneficiaries studied 
by Miranda et al are not related to farming activities. In 
contrast, 85 percent of landowners who do not partici-
pate in PESP have their major source of income in farm 
activities (64 percent from livestock; 21 percent from 
agriculture). Livestock is the main source of income for 
both beneficiaries (31 percent) and non-beneficiaries (64 
percent) of PESP. Even among landowners who receive 
money for forest protection, livestock represents the 
largest share of their income, even more than profes-
sional income. 
These data allow the inference that an important 
share of PESP beneficiaries does not depend on rural 
activities for their livelihood. In comparison, payments 
were not widely made to those who are primarily farm-
ers. In addition, Miranda et al. (2003, p. 1) found that 
beneficiaries were “relatively wealthy and well edu-
cated”. This indicates that PESP was not being used in 
its early years as a poverty alleviation strategy, despite 
its potential to do so. 
Another relevant study, by Zbinden & Lee (2005), 
compared 106 participants and 142 non-participants in 
PESP, owners of areas larger than 5 hectares, randomly 
selected in the northern part of Costa Rica (San Carlos 
and Los Chiles, in the Sarapiqui region). Results showed 
that local landowners with large farms are much more 
likely to participate in all types of PESP contracts than 
smaller landowners. In this sample, contracts in the for-
est protection category were limited to properties with 
more than 50 hectares. Among the farms larger than 
100 hectares, only 7 percent were not enrolled in the 
program, while in small properties the percentages of 
non-participants were significantly higher: 32 percent 
of those with properties with less than 10 hectares; 19 
percent of those with properties in the range of 10 to 
19.9 hectares; and 25 percent of those with medium-
sized properties (between 20 and 49.9 ha) (see Figure 1).
TABLE 4 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Number and Total Area of Properties in the Virilla Watershed Sample Enrolled in 2002, by Property Size. 
property sizes number of 
properties
enrolled 
properties 
non-enrolled 
properties 
total area enrolled in PESP
less than 10 ha 14 5 9 50 ha**
11 to 30 ha 7 5 2 150 ha**
31 to 80 ha 9 7 2 560 ha**
81 to 130 ha 6 6 0 780 ha**
more than 131 ha 9 9 0 1,350 ha***
total 46* 32 14*           2,890 ha
* information unavailable about the size of one property;  
** considering the maximum possible area at each level;
***considering an average of 150 ha for each property.
SOURCE: Adapted from Miranda et al. (2003, p. 21).
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Carvajal et al. (2003) conducted another survey, 
this one at the national level, yielding results about the 
social impacts of PESP. The results are valid on a national 
scale. It was conducted in 2002, exactly when the pro-
gram completed five years and when the first contracts 
ended. Data related to the sample of 1,752 contracts are 
reproduced in Figure 2, showing the number of contracts 
by size and type of beneficiary. 
FIGURE 1 – Costa Rica: Participation in PESP in San Carlos and Los Chiles (Sarapiqui), 
by Type of Contract and Property Size, 2003. (%)
SOURCE: Adapted from Zbinden & Lee, 2005.
FIGURE 2 – Costa Rica: PESP contracts, by size of property and type of beneficiary, 
1997- 2002.
SOURCE: Adapted from Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 12).
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There is a gradual reduction in the incidence of 
contracts as property areas increase from 10 hectares 
to 90 hectares. This first group of properties represents 
approximately 62 percent of PESP contracts. A second 
group (34 percent) is made of companies with proper-
ties between 90 and 300 hectares. The third and smallest 
group (4 percent) is made of “global” contracts with 
community associations that jointly hold more than 300 
hectares. Although these contracts are signed with the 
associations, the real beneficiaries are small landowners 
(properties with less than 50 hectares) (see Figure 3).
This study allows the conclusion that the financial 
disbursement pattern at the national level follows the 
same trend found in the Virilla watershed; most con-
tracts were signed with small landowners, but most of 
the money was paid to beneficiaries who owned large 
properties. 
Considering all PESP contracts signed with owners 
of properties between 10 and 90 hectares, 1,082 of them 
shared the total amount paid for 47,420 ha, an average of 
43.82 hectares per owner. Those enrolled in the protec-
tion category would receive around US$ 14,000 for a 
five-year contract - US$ 2,800 annually; if they signed 
reforestation contracts, each would get US$ 35,000 
over a five-year period. Regarding the second group, 
each of the 670 landholders with properties between 
90 and 300 hectares would be rewarded for conserving 
an average of 183.5 ha. They would have an annual 
income of around US$ 11,800 (US$ 58,720 for a five-
year contract) or almost US$ 150,000 for a reforestation 
agreement. Therefore, a large landowner would receive 
four times more than a small one. In addition, all small 
properties together would receive 2.5 times less money 
than the group of large properties. The logic is clear: the 
larger the area under contract with PESP, the higher the 
reward25 (see Table 5).
FIGURE 3 – Costa Rica: Categories of PESP Beneficiaries, by 
Property Size, 1998-2000 (%) 
SOURCE: Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 13).
25 For an emphatic critique of the concept of both REDD and PES projects in connection with this problem of favoring large landowners and 
thus forgiving their “sins”, see Valny Giacomelli Sobrinho, REDD Roses for a Green Lady – Target Setting for Deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon, available at <http://www.intechopen.com/books/co2-sequestration-and-valorization/redd-roses-for-a-green-lady-target-setting-for-
deforestation-in-the-brazilian-amazon>, accessed on October 14 2014.
TABLE 5 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Estimated Total Areas Enrolled and 
Number of Contracts, by Property Size, 2002
size of property number of 
contracts*
total area 
in PESP 
(ha)**
0 –10 ha 123 1,230
10-20 ha 163 3,260
20-30 ha 157 4,710
30-40 ha 143 5,720
40-50 ha 142 7,100
50-60 ha 126 7,560
60-70 ha 90 6,300
70-80 ha 88 7,040
80-90 ha 50 4,500
sub-total  (10–90 ha) 1,082 47,420
90-100 ha 91 9,100
100-150 ha 181 27,150
150-200 ha 135 27,000
200-300 ha 199 59,700
sub-total (90-300 ha) 670 122,950
300 or more ha 64 19,200
total 1,752 189,570
* Estimated.
** Considering the maximum possible area at each level.
SOURCE: Adapted from Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 13).
Furthermore, data collected by Carvajal et al. 
(2003) show that PESP contracts demand or lead to 
changes in land use in only a limited number of cases. 
The data in Table 6 show that 43 percent of PESP ben-
eficiaries were already protecting natural resources on 
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their lands before enrolling in the program, while 49 
percent were using their land for cattle ranching, agri-
culture or timber harvesting. This large percentage (43 
percent) of protected forests extent in private properties 
prior to PESP is probably linked to the fact that most 
of their owners do not derive their major income from 
farms, as ascertained by Miranda et al. (2003). Regard-
ing these landowners, government intervention through 
PESP contracts does not affect the conservation status 
of their properties, since they would probably maintain 
forest cover on their properties without PESP. Kosoy et 
al. (2005, p. 11) made a similar finding, studying PESP 
beneficiaries in the Heredia region. They concluded 
that landowners who do not depend on rural productive 
activities for their livelihoods will “in any case keep the 
remaining forest cover of their land (…), in part because 
forests provide leisure and scenery to them”, with or 
without PESP. 
TABLE 6 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Percentages of Beneficiaries who 
changed from Agriculture, Cattle Ranching or Other 
Land Uses to PESP Uses, 2002
previous use percentages
PESP uses 43
cattle ranching 36
agriculture 7
logging 6
no use 6
no answer 2
total 100
SOURCE: Adapted from Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 31).
Regarding the remaining 57 percent of the benefi-
ciaries sampled by Miranda et al. (2003), we conclude 
that PESP was more than moderately successful in ad-
dressing market failures. If these farmers stopped using 
their lands for cattle ranching, agriculture and timber 
harvesting, payments made by FONAFIFO were prob-
ably equal or higher than the profits to be derived from 
those land uses. 
Additionally, the data in Table 7 reflect the answers 
given to the question “If PESP did not exist, what would 
you do with your property?”, asked by Carvajal et al. 
(2003): 45 percent of respondents said that they would 
designate the areas on their properties for conservation 
purposes, independently of PESP. 
TABLE 7 – Costa Rica’s PESP: Answers given to the question “If PESP 
did not exist, what would you do with your property?”
answers percentage
conservation 45
pastures 17
sell the property 12
logging 8
agriculture 5
eco-tourism 2
nothing 5
no answer/does not know 6
total 100
SOURCE: Adapted from Carvajal et al. (2003, p. 39).
These findings show that PESP does not neces-
sarily shape landowners’ conservationist behavior in 
the long run. Conservation efforts would probably be 
made privately after PESP implementation by the same 
landowners who were protecting their lands before the 
program. These findings also underline the fact that the 
program manages to correct market failures in some cas-
es, as landowners who would exploit natural resources 
even if there were no financial rewards for protecting 
them change their behavior when benefited by PESP. 
Based on these case studies, we conclude that PESP 
would be more efficient if it selectively targeted private 
properties strongly threatened by deforestation, such as 
those in which agriculture, cattle ranching and timber 
harvesting generate the major portions of household 
income. In addition to attaining stronger conservation 
effects in these types of properties, early PESP initiatives 
could have been used as an intentional poverty mitiga-
tion strategy, if small and poor landowners had been its 
major target groups. 
6. Final Remarks
We conclude that PESP encourages forest pro-
tection in private properties, but we see also that the 
program faces several challenges in terms of related or 
potentially related effects. We examined official data and 
several case studies to conclude that the program suc-
ceeds in reverting land use from clear cutting to forest 
conservation because it corrects market failures. Addi-
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tionally, it was found that its implementation was aided 
by legal improvements and institutional reinforcements 
that occurred over the last two decades. 
PESP created new trade opportunities linked to the 
market of environmental services. Before the program, 
landowners whose income depended mainly on rural 
activities would not protect their forests mostly because 
this decision would restrict profitable activities in agri-
culture, cattle ranching or timber harvesting. Now they 
are financially rewarded for protecting portions of their 
forests in order to provide environmental goods and 
services. Moreover, they can make their lands even more 
profitable if they explore all these possibilities, accord-
ing to their forest management plans or using innovative 
production systems, such as agroforestry. 
PESP would have a much wider social impact, 
though, if it did not benefit mostly landowners who 
would protect natural resources even if the program did 
not exist. To interrupt this trend, the program should give 
a priority status to privately owned areas that face a high 
threat of deforestation, commonly used for productive 
activities that generate most of the household income. 
Besides, the program’s potential of becoming a poverty 
mitigation strategy is not being well used, since a bigger 
share of payments is made to large landowners, many of 
whose incomes do not depend strongly on rural activities.
Although PESP was not designed for poverty 
mitigation, this could be a significant addition to its suc-
cess, but this requires design improvement. According to 
some of the studies contained in Angelsen (2012), this 
has been a major cause for the lack of popularity or the 
failing of PES projects.  Improvements require attention 
to important details. First, the selection of beneficiaries 
must change. Managers should consider not only the 
risk of deforestation and opportunity costs of forest 
conservation, but also the economic and social profile of 
landowners and communities. Defining a tighter profile 
of potential beneficiaries, with priority given to poorer 
rural landowners, can accomplish this. Second, making 
information about the program widely available would 
also help, so that targeted communities could participate 
proactively. A third measure would be the simplifica-
tion of bureaucratic procedures, especially for small 
and medium landowners with relatively low income. A 
fourth measure would be to partially disconnect PESP 
payments from the sizes of the areas under protection 
or recovery, because the criterion of “larger properties, 
higher payments” obviously favors large landowners. 
This could be accomplished by introducing one or more 
correction factors taking into account the income of 
beneficiaries and/or the small sizes of their properties, 
besides the sizes of protected areas. This would direct 
more payments to small landowners. The Costa Rican 
government has already moved in the direction of some 
of these measures. Since 2003, for example, indigenous 
communities began to be accepted in PESP, land titles 
ceased to be required, and collective contracts with small 
landowners’ associations became a priority goal.
Two matters that were not pursued here deserve 
attention in future assessments of PESP: (i) What 
proportion of the federal Costa Rican budget has been 
spent with PESP payments? (ii) What has been PESP’s 
net welfare gain? (iii). Answering these two question of 
course means making an overall evaluation of the costs 
of this financing scheme to Costa Rican government and 
society? Such an effort will be more fruitfully pursued 
if the entire life span of the program is placed under 
examination, because long-term trends will probably 
have set in.
Based on its status of a pioneer PES program 
and on its success, PESP can become an even stron-
ger model for other developing countries with similar 
socioeconomic and environmental problems, not only 
as a mechanism to lower deforestation rates, change 
land uses and expand forest cover, but also as a poverty 
mitigation instrument. 
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